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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000269

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [CA](#) [CWC](#) [BWC](#) [FAC](#)

SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIANS ON CWC AND BWC

REF: (A) OTTAWA 124 (MISSILE DEFENSE) (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶11. (C) SUMMARY. During consultations in Ottawa on January 11, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker and AC/PDAS Frank Record discussed with Canadian Foreign Affairs (FAC) and National Defense officials progress on the BTWC and CWC. Discussion of Canada's prospective participation in ballistic missile defense, FMCT and the Conference on Disarmament, differences on landmine policy, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and space security are reported septels (ref A). END SUMMARY.

OPCW

¶12. (C) FAC Director General for International Security Paul Chapin saw no fundamental disagreement between the U.S. and Canada regarding the OPCW. He observed that there was greater impetus on the industry side to deal with chemical weapons issues and acknowledged the USG-driven focus on anti-terrorism and the need down the road to address the question of non-lethal weapons. Chapin voiced concern for the financial well being of the institution, stating that changes to the financial rules would help the significant arrears. Member states should honor their declaration obligations and their financial obligations, he said.

¶13. (C) A/S Rademaker said the U.S. was pleased with the direction in which the OPCW is headed. He indicated that he and OPCW Technical Secretariat Director General Rogelio Pfirter had exchanged views on the future of the organization. It seemed unlikely that Russia would meet the 2012 deadline for destruction of all CW stocks. Rademaker noted that unanticipated legal, environmental and technical challenges had slowed U.S. progress on its own destruction efforts, though USG was still hoping to make the deadline. Toxic waste was an ongoing issue of concern. Albania and Libya had come clean. In short, there was no great risk the OPCW would run out of things to do in the near future. Regarding U.S. arrears in payments to the OPCW, Rademaker noted that the U.S. Congress had not appropriated sufficient funds. It was the subject of some debate within the U.S. government.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

¶14. (C) On the BTWC, Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Director Rob McDougall said that his government was pleased with the inter-sessional work program process, and noted Canada's submission of eight papers to date. Canada had found the dialogue useful and was engaged in "forward planning" for the 6th Review Conference in 2006. McDougall thought that the BTWC could be improved to deal with additional challenges, such as terrorism. Advocating acceptance of "modest" proposals (e.g. science and technology body) to move the agenda forward, he cited Russia's 1992 acknowledgment of some of its bio-weapons facilities to illustrate the success of the annual confidence building measures submission towards development of stronger compliance and verification mechanisms in the BTWC.

¶15. (C) A/S Rademaker said the USG was satisfied with the work progress of the last two years and did not have any conclusions about the objectives for or outcome of the 6th Review Conference. Nonetheless, there was apprehension that many ideas being put forth were designed to resurrect the Protocol negotiations that had failed in 2001. U.S. experience of the past decade had made us extremely cautious on this count, Rademaker said. McDougall asserted that high-priority, limited "variable" things could lead to strengthening of the regime. It was in Canada's interest to "make it happen," he said. It was important to move forward, not necessarily back to the Protocol.

¶16. (C) Observing that one more year remained under the existing work program, Rademaker welcomed any observations from Canada's access to facilities in the former Soviet Union, including on the re-employment of former bio-weapons scientists. Arms Control Deputy Director Marina Laker said that Canadian officials had sought and gained access to some facilities in Russia through Global Partnership efforts and the ISTC. They had concluded from these visits that former scientists really wanted cooperation. McDougall and Chapin offered to organize de-briefs for U.S. arms control experts

by their Canadian counterparts.

17. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Rademaker.

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